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On Attitudes Toward Death 
and the Cost of Dying 
Edward J. O'Boyle, Ph.D. 
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meet-
ings of the Allied Social Science Associations in Chicago in August, 
1978. The author, an associate professor at Louisiana Tech University, 
revised the paper in December, 1978. (. 
The late Andre Hellegers pointed out how elastic the definition of 
health and, therefore , the definition of health needs has become in 
recent years. The World Health Organization, stated Hellegers, defines 
health " as not only the absence of disease, but as the presence of a 
sense of total physical, mental and social well-being." 1 In the extreme 
this means, according to Hellegers, that the medical profession must 
abolish death. A second definition of health is based on the absence of 
discomfort and, Hellegers stated, logically requires the profession to 
provide death. 2 A third definition of health views death as natural and 
urges physicians to accept it. 
In this article we attempt to show that there are three distinct 
attitudes toward death supporting three different types of demand for 
health services, and that the three types of demand have powerful 
implications for basic resource requirements and costs. Furthermore, 
when all of these considerations are viewed in the context of cost-
benefit analysis, other implications for such values as the quality of 
life, a sense of community, and individual liberty follow. Finally, we 
suggest a way of using cost-benefit estimates which replaces the class-
ification of persons as (1) productive and deserving treatment or 
(2) unproductive and not meriting treatment with a classification of 
modes of treatment as (1) excessively expensive and properly regarded 
as a gift or (2) not excessively expensive and properly regarded as an 
individual right and an individual or social obligation. 
Abolition of Death 
The abolition of death is an attitude that emerged first in the 
United States at the beginning of the 20th century and is linked his-
torically to the enlightenment of the 18th century.3 Death is seen as 
shameful and forbidden; it should be made to disappear.4 The emer-
gence of this attitude parallels the development of science and tech-
nology which supply superior means of survival and, at the same time, 






superior means of destruction. 5 According to Elizabeth Kubler-Ross, 
the new weapons of mass destruction have so increased the fear of 
death by violent means that man attempts to cope with the reality of 
his own death by denial. 6 
The spectre of malpractice and criminal prosecution means that, 
increasingly, the withholding or withdrawing of the latest technology 
is equated with killing. Third-party payment schemes assure that this 
technology is widely available. Kubler-Ross suggests that the demand 
for technological improvements is stimulated by health professionals 
who, because they are unable to accept death which from their 
perspective amounts to personal failure, displace their knowledge onto 
machines. This denial and displacement, in turn, seems to encourage 
an increasingly mechanical and dehumanized environment in the 
delivery of health services. 7 
For sure, abolishing death is not the only inspiration for technolog-
ical change in the health care field. Frequently the same advanced 
technology is used in ways that truly affirm the value of life. Indeed 
there are many instances in which sophisticated technological devices 
are the only means of maintaining life while the patient is being 
restored to good health. 
For that reason, the abolition of death view is not the only factor 
underlying the vast increases in health care expenditures that are 
directly attributable to technological change. I! In those instances 
where the technology is used to temporarily maintain life, the heavy 
costs of this technology are properly associated with the saving of life. 
If, on the other hand, it is used to maintain life when the patient has 
no prospects for restoration to good health, the heavy outlays are 
associated with the prolonging of death. Further, if it is employed in a 
so-called hopeless case over a long period of time, it is proper to asssign 
these expenditures to the abolishing of death. 
Provision of Death 
The provision of death is an attitude which views pain and suffering 
, as meaningless and sees death as the final solution to a life that is 
regarded as devoid of meaning. As with the abolition-of-death posi-
tion, the provision-of-death attitude is plainly hedonistic. 9 For cen-
turies the provision-of-death attitude has been acted out in the form 
of suicide and has been publicly allowed in that form in various 
societies including ancient Rome where suicide was regarded as a 
proper means for saving face. 10 
Modern interest in the provision of death in the form of euthanasia 
dates from the 1870s. The euthanasia movement began in Britain in 
the early 1930s and came to the United States several years later. As 
recently as 1972 there were no countries whose laws permitted the 
practice of mercy killing. 11 
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In the last few years, however, "death-with-dignity" bills have 
proliferated in the United States. California enacted the first such law 
in 1976. Bills of this type were introduced in at least 41 states in 
1977. In seven (Arkansas, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, North 
Carolina, Oregon, and Texas), death-with-dignity bills were actually 
passed. None of the new laws are perfectly alike. In California, for 
instance, mercy killing is explicitly excluded. In Arkansas, Idaho, and 
New Mexico, even though mercy killing is not authorized, it is not 
explicitly prohibited either.12 According to Grisez and Boyle, all iof 
these bills, whether enacted or not, have two serious consequences. 
First, they pave the way for homicide by withholding or withdrawing 
treatment, and, second, they tend to enhance support for directly 
killing certain patients. 13 
Clearly som.~ of the techniques of providing death (in the form of 
suicide or mercy killing) are simple and inexpensive, especially by 
comparison with the techniques of abolishing death. Notwithstanding 
those vast differences in costs, the provision-of-death attitude and the 
abolition-of-death attitude are alike in that both put man at the center 
of the universe by the implicit claim that man is the author of life. In 
effect, the human body is viewed as property which man may use as it 
suits him. For the most part this "right" is limited to one's own body. 
In the case of involuntary mercy killing, however, the "right" to 
dispose of this property is claimed by another person. In that sense, 
involuntary mercy killing amounts to the re-establishment of slavery 
in one of its cruelest forms. 
Stanley Hauerwas shows that the provision-of-death attitude, with 
its emphasis on relieving suffering, has important consequences for 
medical progress. 
Medicine advances because physicians and those in anc illary professions 
have been willing to allow others to endure pain, thereby creating the condi· 
tions that impel the imagination to explore forms of care not yet conceived.14 
Hauerwas is neither utilitarian nor sado-masochistic. 
I do not suggest that suffering should be sought for its own sake or that 
suffering should be accepted as a way of becoming good. Rather, I am 
trying to suggest that though suffering is not to be sought, neither must we 
assume it should always be avoided. Often we achieve the good only because 
we are willing to endure in ourselves and in others an existence of suffering 
and pain. 15 
Arthur Dyck points to one of the "goods" - a sense of community -
which is contingent on certain constraints against killing, suicide in 
particular . 
50 
Suicide is the ultimately effective way of shutting out all other people 
from one's life. Every kind of potentia lly and actually meaningful contact 
and relation among persons is irrevocably severed except by means of 
m emories or other forms of life beyond death. 
An inevitable death can b e accepted without guilt; the decision on the 







overtones and guilt-ridden doubts for anyone who participated in even the 
smallest way in that person's dying . . .. 
Everyone and every group in a community is potentially a victim of a 
principle that accepts some lives as unworthy to live; the very young, the 
very old, and racial and ethnic minorities are especially threatened in a 
society that accepts such a principle. 16 
Acceptance of Death 
The acceptance-of-death attitude has its historical roots in the early 
Middle Ages. 17 It occupies the middle ground between the extremes 
of the abolition-of-d.eath view with its high-cost, complex technology 
and the provision-of-death view with its low-cost, simple technology. 
It neither prolongs the dying needlessly nor precipitates it directly and 
intentionally. 
Whereas the other two incorporate the property concept of the 
relationship between person and body, the acceptance-of-death view-
point incorporates the stewardship concept. Whereas the other two are 
anthropocentric, the acceptance-of-death position is theocentric. 
Suffering is regarded as meaningful because one's reward in heaven 
depends on "the courage and grace, patience and dignity" with which 
the burden of suffering is shouldered. 18 
The acceptance-of-death view is perhaps best demonstrated by the 
hospice concept of care for the dying. This concept of care emphasizes 
control of the patient's symptoms to enable that person to come to 
grips with his impending death. The collaboration between family and 
staff in the care of the dying is one important way that a hospice 
promotes a sense of community. 19 
The hospice concept rejects the high-cost, complex technology that 
characterizes the abolition-of-death view on grounds that, for the 
terminally ill. it prolongs the dying needlessly. Figures published in 
1976 indicate that the daily charges at the hospice in New Haven, 
Connecticut are roughly one-half the rate at a general hospital.2o It 
also rejects the low-cost, simple technology of the provision-of-death 
view on grounds that the patient who asks to be killed is not receiving 
the health care he needs. 21 Hospice care is not expensive. The rate in 
1976 at the New Haven facility was $104-108 per day. 22 
The hospice concept is based on the well-known principle that 
ordinary means of survival are to be provided because those means are 
the only ones that the patient can claim as being owed in justice. 23 
The principle of ordinary means embodies certain normative concepts 
that are likely to be defined differently by different persons in differ-
ent circumstances. Even though at times it may be quite difficult to 
differentiate ordinary from extraordinary means of survival, difficul-
ties of this kind only complicate the application of the principle. They 
do not per se invalidate it. 
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The proper application of the principle of ordinary means may call 
for judgment from specialists in fields other than medicine, such as 
law, economics, and psychology. With regard to economics, it is 
instructive that the principle of ordinary means is consistent with 
Heinrich Pesch's principle of satisfying adequately normal human 
needs. Rupert Ederer translates what Pesch means by this principle as 
follows: 
The task of the economic process is the optimum satisfacton of peoples' 
wants that is possible in given circumstances of time and place, where 
individualized wants are satisfied only with due reference to the general 
context of wants. 24 
The principle of ordinary means does not imply that the patient 
may not avail himself of certain extraordinary means of survival. It 
connotes, rather, that such means need not be provided. Their 
provision, therefore, is to be viewed not as morally required but as 
freely given. 
Cost-Benefit Estimates: The Conventional Application 
The logic of cost-benefit analysis argues that health services be 
provided to those for whom the benefits exceed the costs and be 
withheld from those for whom benefits fall short of costs. The 
coupling of cost-benefit rules and the abolition-of-death viewpoint 
leads to different outcomes when freedom of choice is allowed and 
when it is not allowed, unless actually wanting to live is critical to 
survival. Among persons in need of health services, proportionately 
more of those who are treated than those who are not will survive 
whether they freely choose treatment or not. This means that some 
who are treated will not survive and some who are in need and are not 
treated will survive. Some, possibly most, of those who are treated and 
survive will be satisfied with the outcome and others will not. Some of 
the latter group may become so despondent over the quality of life 
that they end it by their own hand. 
Allowing freedom of choice is likely to be more costly than denying 
it. Some of those who are in need and for whom the costs are less than 
the benefits will not choose to be treated and consequently will be 
more likely to die. Some for whom the costs are greater than the 
benefits will choose to be treated and consequently will be more likely 
to live. Clearly, the freedom-of-choice option drives up the cost of an 
already high-cost delivery system. 
The great advantages that derive from implementing the abolition-
of-death view is that some persons who are in need of services and are 
treated will live longer. For some, however, the additional longevity 
amounts to simply prolonging the dying. Moreover, the complex tech-





nology tends to separate the patient from the staff, thereby dehuman-
izing the patient. When suicide is permitted, the abolition-of-death 
view becomes especially destructive of a sense of community. 
In principle, the utilitarian logic of cost-benefit decision-making, 
when it is coupled with involuntary mercy killing, results in certain 
death for all persons in need of health services for whom the costs of 
treatment exceed the benefits. Some of those who qualify for treat-
ment under these strict rules will die anyway. Others will survive but 
may choose later to end their life out of despair as to the compelling 
requirement to remain productive in order to justify their continued 
existence. Removing the involuntary mercy killing provision makes for 
greater uncertainty as to final outcome. Some of those for whom the 
costs of treatment exceed the benefits will choose life and some of 
those with benefits in excess of costs will choose death. 
The great advantage of the provision-of-death view is found in its 
cost-containment potential. However, the killing that attends this 
view, as Dyck points out, is most destructive of a sense of community. 
Furthermore, involuntary mercy killing spells the end of individual 
liberty because the taking of a human life destroys all other rights and 
freedoms of that person. 
Cost-benefit rules have an important impact on outcomes when 
they are linked with the acceptance-of-death view and freedom of 
choice as to the use of extraordinary means is denied. Under these 
circumstances only those persons in need for whom the costs are less 
than the benefits qualify for treatment that employs extraordinary 
means. Strictly speaking, health care is either owed in justice or it is 
merited. It cannot be given freely. 
At first glance, these rules seem not to affect the outcome when 
freedom of choice is allowed. However, they do matter importantly 
and Piper shows us why. 
The possibility - indeed, the necessity - of a consistent policy of 
manipulating others and calculating their responses as variables in the service 
of a larger goal reveals a serious problem with the very concept of a consis· 
tent Utilitarian doctrine ... . The first principle of Utilitarianism can be seen 
as a special case of the non·moral rationality principle of efficient means, in 
which the particular goal to be most expediently achieved is specified as 
that of maximizing social utility .... 
The goal of maximizing social utility is so encompassing that any act 
performed in an interpersonal context must be evaluated for whether its 
consequences are relevant to, or constitutive of, its realization. 
This means that a concern with soc ial utility must form some part of the 
motivation of a consistent Utilitarian in any interact ion he engages in, 
indeed in any play of action he undertakes: this is the full sense in which 
Utilitarianism provides the only rule of conduct for one committed to this 
doctrine. It may be that some such activities are then found or judged to be 
irre levant to furthering social utility. But this can only be a consequ ence, 
and not a presupposition, of an evaluation to which every action is initially 
susceptible. This reveals the extent to which calculation - hence manipula· 
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tion - must inform the Utilitarian's every decision, action, and deliberate 
[·esponse. 
So if people know that someone is a committed Utilitarian, they are 
bound to feel somewhat used or manipulated, somewhat suspicious of his 
manifestations or feeling, involvement with or professed regard for them, 
and somewhat resentfu l of his attitude. 25 
The manipulation that inevitably results when cost-benefit rules are 
employed in the decisions as to the proper allocation of health services 
is inimical to the virtue of trust which is the disposition most proper 
to the physician-patient relationship.26 It follows that cost-benefit 
rules can be a direct threat to the foundations of a caring health 
services delivery system. 
Cost-Benefit Estimates: A Suggested Application 
It does not follow, however, that cost-benefit estimates should 
never be used in the treatment decision. One of the central problems 
with the conventional application of cost-benefit estimates in the 
health services field is that it does not differentiate ordinary from 
extraordinary means of survival. Further, it classifies individual 
patients dichotomously: the ones who merit treatment because they 
are sufficiently productive and the ones who do not merit treatment 
because they are not sufficiently productive. 
This arbitrary classification of persons can be eliminated if cost-
benefit estimates are used instead to classify modes of treatment as 
excessively expensive (extraordinary means) or not excessively expen-
sive (ordinary means). Table 1 displays a scheme for classifying modes 
of treatment as ordinary or extraordinary according to a comparison 
of current costs and benefits (row 1) and current and future costs and 
benefits (row 2) for the individual person in need using personal 
resources (column 1) and for all persons in need using society's 
resources (column 2). For example, a mode of treatment which at 
present is excessively expensive (EE) for a person who is destitute may 
be classified as not excessively expensive (NEE) for all persons with 
the same need because of significant differences in the resources avail-
able in society. Additionally, the same mode of treatment which is 
classified as NEE today may be considered EE because of costs that 
are deferred to the future. 
The modes of treatment that are classified as NEE are owed in 
justice as a corollary from the right to life itself (see our footnote 23). 
This obligation in justice does not extend to the modes that are class-
ified as EE although such means may be provided as gifts. 
For sure, there are serious difficulties that attend the use of the 
normative concept "excessively expensive." Different definitions will 
be supplied by different persons in different circumstances. Even so, 
there are some important advantages that follow from the elastic 





TABLE 1. Scheme for Classifying Modes of Treatment 
as Ordinary or Extraordinary Means: Norm of Economic Burden 
Individuals in Need All Persons in Need 
Using Using 
Comparison of: Personal Resources Society's Resources 
Cu rrent Costs and 
EE NEE Benefits 
Current and Future 
EE Costs and Benefits 
EE: Excessively Expensive 
NEE: Not Excessively Expensive 
EE 
nature of the concept. Surgery such as hip-joint replacement is more 
likely to be EE in a relatively poor country like Mexico than in a 
wealthy country like the United States. Further, the definition that 
applies in a particular place is supplied by those who live there and 
who Will bear the burden and reap the rewards that go with it. 
To give precise meaning to "excessively expensive, " studies are 
needed that show the actual costs and benefits for vari9us modes of 
treatment and kinds of patients. By revealing how various persons and 
families actually manage their financial affairs when they become sick 
and are treated, these studies would enable us to specify with greater 
particularity whether a given service is EE or not. 
Using the scheme presented in Table 1, there are 14 classification 
sets possible for every treatment mode. Applying the principles of sub-
sidiarity, equality , and the common good, along with Pesch 's principle 
of satisfying adequately normal human needs, the 14 sets can be 
grouped into two broad classes: sets 1-4 and sets 5-14 (Table 2). In set 
1 the treatment mode is properly regarded as an individual right and 
obligation in justice. Sets 2 through 4 are closely related t o set 1 ; the 
treatment mode is regarded as an individual right and a social obliga-
tion. A social obligation need not require government intervention. It 
may be met through private third-party payment schemes. 
In set 5 the treatment mode is properly regarded as a gift. So too is 
it in sets 6 through 11 which evidence no conflict between the individ-
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TABLE 2. Scheme for Determining Whether Treatment Mode 
Is a Right and an Obligation or a Gift 
Right/Obligation 






NEE I NEE (3) 
EE NEE 
~ (4) EE NEE 
Gift 
~ (5) EE EE 
~ ~ (6) (9) NEE NEE NEE EE 
I I 
~ ~ (7) (10) EE EE EE EE 
I I 
~ (8) ~ (11 ) EE EE EE NEE
EE: Excessively Expensive 
NEE: Not Excessively Expensive 








(1) Individual must provide for own needs and take treatment mode required for 
survival. Society is not obliged to help individual, although it may have to 
force individual to take treatment mode required. 
(2) Individual cannot afford treatment mode at present, but society can afford it 
for everyone in need. Treatment mode is social obligation and individual 
right. Individual must take treatment mode provided by society. 
(3) Individual cannot afford treatment mode because of future burden, but 
society can for everyone in need. Treatment mode is social obligation and 
individual right. Individual must take treatment mode provided by society. 
(4) Individual cannot afford treatment mode because of current and future 
burden, but society can for everyone in need. Treatment mode is social 
obligation and individual right. Individual must take treatment mode provided 
by society. 
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(5) Treatment mode is EE for individual and society. Individual can refuse to 
provide or take treatment mode and society is not obliged to provide it. 
Treatment mode may be provided as gift by one individual to another, or by 
society to various individuals selected at random to reflect basic equality of 
those in need. 
(6) Treatment mode is EE in terms of current burden. Individual can refuse to 
provide or take treatment mode and society is not obliged to provide it. 
Treatment mode may be provided as gift. 
(7) Treatment mode is EE in terms of overall burden. Individual can refuse to 
provide or take treatment mode and society is not obliged to provide it. 
Treatment mode may be provided as gift. 
(8) Treatment mode is EE for individual and society when current and future 
costs and benefits are evaluated in terms of resources available. I ndividual can 
refuse to provide or take treatment mode. and society is not obliged to 
provide it. Treatment mode may be provided as gift. 
(9) Treatment mode is EE at present for individual and society. Individual can 
refuse to provide or take treatment mode and society is not obliged to 
provide it. Treatment mode may be provided as gift. 
(10) Treatment mode is EE when current and future costs and benefits are eval· 
uated in terms of resources available. Individual can refuse to provide or take 
treatment mode and society is not obliged to provide it. Treatment mode may 
be provided as gift. 
(11) Treatment mode is EE at present for individual and society. Individual can 
refuse to provide or take treatment mode and society is not obliged to 
provide it. Treatment mode may be provided as gift. 
(12) Treatment mode is NEE for individual who is required to provide and take it. 
However, it is EE for society at present. Common good argues that society 
limit individual freedom. Conflict is resolved by allowing only certain individ· 
uals, selected at random, to exercise their right. Under these circumstances 
treatment mode becomes gift. 
(13) Treatment mode is NEE for individual who is required to provide and take it. 
However, it is EE for society when current and future costs and benefits are 
evaluated in terms of resources available to society. Common good argues that 
society limit individual freedom. Conflict is resolved by allowing only certain 
individuals, selected at random, to exercise their right. Treatment mode 
becomes a gift. 
(14) Treatment mode is NEE for individual who is required to provide and take it. 
However, it is EE for society at present and overall. Common good argues 
that society limit individual freedom. Conflict is resolved by allowing certain 
individuals, selected at random, to exercise their right. Treatment mode 
becomes gift. 
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ual and society. Sets 12 through 14 are like set 5 in the sense that the 
treatment mode is regarded as a gift. They are unlike the others 
because they reflect conflict between the individual and society which 
is resolved by the application of the principle of common good. 
A final step in the research to evaluate the health care system in 
terms of the health needs of persons who would otherwise die involves 
a determination as to whether or not the system actually delivers what 
is owed in justice and if not, what modifications are necessary to 
assure that the ordinary means of survival are routinely available. 
Further, research should be conducted to determine if the health care 
system is being coerced into delivering services which are properly 
classified as extraordinary means of survival since health services that 
are delivered under coercion cannot be regarded as gifts. If such 
coercion exists, the system requires modification that would end such 
abuse but would still allow the practice of extraordinary means that 
are freely given. 
In our judgment there is no compelling evidence that the U.S. 
health care delivery system requires additional public intervention to 
meet the health needs (properly understood) of persons in extremis. 
Indeed, if such intervention were to fail to recognize the difference 
between excessively expensive and not excessively expensive treatment 
modes, it is quite possible that health care costs will escalate at a rate 
higher than the current one. Accordingly we suggest that the resource 
allocation system offering the best promise of controlling the rising 
cost of health care is one that uses market prices to allocate resources 
among competing uses and one in which all payment schemes 
acknowledge the essential difference between excessively expensive 
and not excessively expensive means of survival. 
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